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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lance Raymond Selleck appeals from the district court’s order denying his
motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order entered upon his conviction for felony
violation of a no contact order.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In April 2016, Selleck was convicted of felony violation of a no contact order and
the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years with one year fixed.
(R., pp.56-58.) At the end of the sentencing hearing, the court ordered that Selleck
have no contact with the victim, Chelaye Dodd, for 50 years, “thus expiring on April 6,
2066.” (Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.2 (via visual line count).) Several weeks later, the court
entered an Order for No Contact which stated: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
defendant shall have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on
April 6, 2066.” (R., pp.59-60.)
Selleck filed a Motion to Dismiss or Modify Order for No Contact, arguing that the
district court’s order did not comply with the specific requirements of I.C.R. 46.2
(R., pp.68-71), and the state filed an objection (R., pp.73-74). At the end of a hearing,
the district court denied Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order.
(R., p.72; Tr., p.30, L.17 – p.31, L.24.)
Selleck filed a notice of appeal timely from the Order denying his motion to
dismiss or modify the no contact order. (R., pp.79-82.)
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ISSUE
Selleck states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Selleck’s motion
to dismiss or modify the no contact order entered in this case?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
If this Court finds the district court erred by denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or
modify the no contact order, should this case be remanded to the district court for
modification of the no contact order?
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ARGUMENT
If This Court Finds The District Court Erred By Denying Selleck’s Motion To Dismiss Or
Modify The No Contact Order, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court
For Modification Of The No Contact Order
A.

Introduction
Selleck argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion

to dismiss or modify the no contact order. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-7.) Selleck asserts
that the district court failed to fully comply with I.C.R. 46.2 by omitting several required
statements from the no contact order. In the event this Court concludes that the district
court erred by denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order, this
case should be remanded to the district court to modify the no contact order to cure
such error.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review.” State v. Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 339 P.3d 1126 (2014) (quoting
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008)).
C.

To The Extent This Court Finds The No Contact Order Omitted Information
Required By I.C.R. 46.2, This Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court
For Modification Of The No Contact Order To Comply With That Rule
At the end of Selleck’s sentencing hearing, the district court ruled:
I’m also going to order, Mr. Selleck, that you have no contact with the
victim in this case for the next 50 years, and that any contact with her at
any time in the next 50 years will result, once again, in a felony charge – I
believe, is how the statute reads. However, the no contact order remains
in place and will be extended, as indicated, for 50 years from today’s date.
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(Tr., p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.2 (via visual line count).)

Several weeks later, the court

entered an Order for No Contact which fully stated: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
defendant shall have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on
April 6, 2066.” (R., pp.59-60.)
Selleck filed a Motion to Dismiss or Modify Order for No Contact, arguing, in the
main, that the district court’s 50-year expiration period went beyond its jurisdictional
authority, which, he argued, should have been limited to the maximum possible
sentence for the offense – five years. (R., pp.68-71.) Selleck’s motion also contended
the district court’s order did not comply with the specific requirements of I.C.R. 46.2,
because it lacked the following mandatory statements or information: (1) a distance
restriction, (2) a statement that, as an alternative to a specific expiration date, the order
would expire “upon dismissal of the case,” (3) any of the three advisories under
subsection (a)(4), and (4) an indication that the written order was served on or signed
by Selleck. (R., pp.68-71.)
During a hearing on Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order,
the attorneys and the district court focused on Selleck’s argument that the 50-year
expiration date went beyond the court’s jurisdictional authority, which, Selleck
contended, should be limited to the five-year maximum statutory sentence for felony
violation of a no contact order.1 (See generally R., pp.24-32.) At the end of the hearing,
the court ruled: (1) the 50-year no contact provision complied with I.C.R. 46.2 because it
provided a specific time frame for the order, (2) the court’s jurisdiction to order no
contact with the victim was not limited by the five-year maximum sentence for the no
1

Selleck was not present during the hearing on his motion to dismiss or modify the no
contact order. (Tr., p.24, Ls.4-6.)
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contact order offense, and (3) Selleck had notice of the provisions of the no contact
order because it was pronounced in open court when he was sentenced. (Tr., p.30,
L.17 – p.31, L.24.) The court entered an Order denying Selleck’s motion. (R., p.72.)
On appeal, and in contrast to the main argument he presented to the district
court (see generally R., pp.68-71; Tr., pp.24-32), Selleck does not argue that the 50year life of the no contact order went beyond the time limits of the court’s jurisdiction
(see Appellant’s Brief, p.4 n.4).

Instead, Selleck argues that the court abused its

discretion by failing to modify its no contact order in compliance with I.C.R. 46.2(a) to
include:

(1) a statement that it would expire upon dismissal of the case (as an

alternative to the expiration date), (2) an advisory that a violation of the order may be
prosecuted as a separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an
appearance before a judge, (3) a statement that the order can only be modified by a
judge, (4) an advisory that where more than one protective order is in place, the most
restrictive provisions will control if any of the terms are in conflict, and (5) verification
that the written order was served on or signed by Selleck. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-7);
see I.C.R. 46.2(a).
The district court issued the no contact order at issue in this case pursuant to
I.C. § 18-920(1). The procedural requirements applicable to such no contact orders are
set forth in I.C.R. 46.2, which provides, in relevant part:
(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that
district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following
information:
(1) The case number, defendant’s name and protected person’s
name;
5

(2) A distance restriction;
(3) That the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date,
or upon dismissal of the case;
(4) An advisory that:
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail
will be set until an appearance before a judge, and
the possible penalties for this crime,
(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a
judge,
(c) When more than one domestic violence protection
order is in place, the most restrictive provision will
control any conflicting terms of any other civil or
criminal protection order.
As Selleck acknowledges on appeal, the no contact order in this case complies
with I.C.R. 46.2 “in that it contains the case number . . . , the defendant’s name . . . , the
protected person’s name . . . , and the expiration date . . . .” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.5-6.)
Contrary to Selleck’s assertions, the no contact order also complies with at least three
additional aspects of I.C.R. 46.2(a). First, because the court ordered that Selleck “shall
have no contact with Chelaye Dodd for fifty (50) years, thus expiring on April 6, 2066”
(R., p.59), the order complies with I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3), and any need to alternatively
advise Selleck that the order would expire “upon dismissal of the case” was rendered
moot. Next, in regard to the initial part of I.C.R. 46.2(a)(4)(a), during his sentencing
hearing, the district court informed Selleck that any contact with the victim “at any time
in the next 50 years will result, once again, in a felony charge[.]” (Tr., p.21, Ls.20–24.)
Finally, the district court correctly ruled that Selleck had notice of the no contact order
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because it was announced in open court in his presence during his sentencing hearing.
(Tr., p.31, Ls.6-8; see id., p.21, Ls.20-24.)
In regard to the remaining allegations that the no contact order did not comply
with I.C.R. 46.2(a) – i.e., the subsection (a)(2) distance restriction and the three-part
advisory required under subsection (a)(4) – should this Court conclude that the no
contact order failed to include one or more mandatory provisions, this case should be
remanded to the district court to modify the no contact order appropriately.

Idaho

Criminal Rule 52 provides that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” I.C.R. 52. Here, any omission of any
of the required statements or information set forth in I.C.R. 46.2 is easily remedied by
modification of the no contact order on remand to the district court, and none of
Selleck’s substantial rights could have been affected due to the no contact order’s noncompliance with the rule, nor has Selleck suggested otherwise.

(See generally

Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-7.)
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
denying Selleck’s motion to dismiss or modify the no contact order to the extent the no
contact order complies with I.C.R. 46.2, and, to the extent appropriate, remand for
modification of the no contact order to conform to that rule.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2017.

_/s/ John C. McKinney________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of May, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JCM/dd

_/s/ John C. McKinney_______
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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